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Abstract 
Institutions represent rules of behavior in a particular society, the limitations that a 
person has designed to shape interactions between people. Inclusive institutions 
promote the rule of law, maximize efficiency and social well-being and contribute 
to the achievement of higher rates of economic growth and represent key economic 
freedoms. Inclusive institutions provide security of private property, an impartial 
legal system and public services that provide equality in exchange and contracting, 
as well as citizens' participation in economic activities. Residents of countries with 
such type of institutions have access to political institutions, which gives them the 
opportunity to participate in the democratic process, to elect representatives of the 
authorities, change them, etc. Extractive institutions, as opposite to inclusive 
institutions, allow access to political power only to a privileged circle of people. 
The aim of this institutions is to subtract income and wealth from one social 
subgroup in favor of the other. The emergence, development and establishment of 
inclusive institutions is not a short process and it also implies the fulfillment of 
certain political prerequisites such as: the representation of parliamentary tradition 
and therefore political culture, compliance with laws and regulations, respecting 
private property rights, respecting state property rights, strong public opinion etc. 
Greater representation of inclusive institutions will certainly contribute to EU 
integration. 
 
Keywords: inclusive institutions, extractive institutions, integrations, governance, 
rule of low, growth 
 
INTRODUCTION 
One definition that comprehensively determines the notion of institutions and thus 
is generally accepted is the one that indicates that the institutions are the rules of 
behavior in a particular society and the restrictions that a person has designed to 
shape interactions between people. The aforementioned definition of institutions 
shows us that the institutions are connections and rules of behavior in the mutual 
interactions of people. Each individual is familiar with potential benefits that he can 
achieve if he respects certain "rules of the game", but is also aware of the potential 
sanctions and costs incurred by non-compliance with the rules. In the recent years, 
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the use of the term "institution" has been widespread in the social sciences and 
reflects the growth of the institutional economy (North 1990, 13). This term is also 
used in other disciplines such as law, philosophy, sociology, politics, geography. 
As North points out, institutions are based on formal but also informal behavior 
rules, as well as mechanisms that allow their implementation. The existence of 
institutions cannot guarantee us with certainty that each individual will behave in a 
socially acceptable and desirable way, but the existence of institutions will certainly 
increase the likelihood of compliance with the rules and regulations. Every 
individual who violates the rules of behavior must bear certain costs (North 1990, 
14-16). 
Geoffrey Hodgson points out that all activities in society are based on a specific 
institutional framework and all social interactions are under the concept of 
institutions. Also, institutions can be defined as a set of rules and norms that 
determine patterns of behavior of economic actors in a society (Hodgson 2006, 1-3). 
Boland and Newman also deal with the problem of defining institutions, but within 
neoclassical theory. Institutions represent a certain kind of constraint that can be 
transparently given or tacitly defined to determine equilibrium positions in a social 
community (Boland and Newman 1979, 72-74). As authors point out, if one takes 
into account the aspect of economic policy, institutions can be defined as dynamic, 
active instruments by which it is possible to postpone or inhibit the occurrence of a 
particular change, or, on the other hand, to accelerate the development of the 
change. In this way, the authors point to the dynamic and static nature of institutions 
which on the one hand can guarantee economic stability, while on the other hand 
can be the drivers of economic change and thus become a source of economic 
instability. 
North considers that institutions are never static and he pays special attention to 
formal and informal institutions when defining institutions. According to Raiser, 
informal institutions can be seen as a set of rules and norms imposed by society and 
moral values that affect individuals and organizations (or even force them) to strive 
to achieve their goals (Raiser 1997). The author points out that efficient informal 
institutions significantly influence economic development by reducing transaction 
costs and fostering state efficiency. 
 
INSTITUTIONS, RULE OF LAW AND EU INTEGRATIONS 
As Fukuyama points out, state building is precisely based on strengthening existing 
and creating completely new state institutions (Fukuyama 2004, 7). Institutions are 
precisely those that determine how stable and economically developed countries are 
and constitute a key development variable. Stability of institutions can actually be 
viewed as an indicator of the maturity of a society. Institutions are very important 
not only for the countries in transition, but they are also the preconditions for the 
development of an economy. The representation of weak institutions in one 
economy is reflected in the following statements (Šuković 2002, 26): 
 The existence of a weak state, unable to enforce laws, collect taxes, oppose 
pressures from interest groups, etc.,  
 Lack of political leadership and credible implementation of political 
reforms, 
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 Poor local self-government and poorly defined relations between central 
and local authorities,  
 Widespread corruption resulting from excessive bureaucratic interventions 
and excessive regulation, 
 Inconsistent and weak public procurement procedure based on 
administrative orders and only partially on market offers (Jovanović 2002, 
247-249), 
 Poor supervisory and regulatory procedures for the financial sector, etc. 
EU Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for 
and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well 
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union (European Council 1993). 
Serbia, as a new state is expected to prove during the accession process that it is 
able to apply the legal heritage of the EU in its territory from the date of accession 
in the same way as the old member states. Serbia must prove all this during the 
accession period. Therefore, the harmonization of domestic legislation in that period 
and the construction of institutions that must be able to apply law, as well as the 
presence of courts overseeing the entire system, are of key importance. We can 
conclude that the ability to apply EU law in the territory of the Republic of Serbia is 
a condition for membership, not its consequence (European Commission 2018). 
Judicial reform encompasses the necessity of becoming independent, impartial, 
efficient, responsible and professional. The fight against corruption includes several 
aspects, including preventive action, repression in terms of prosecuting corruption 
offenses and an institutional framework, which must be set up to ensure effective 
resolution of this issue (Međak 2016, 80-81). In order to fulfill the conditions in this 
chapter (Chapter 23: Judiciary and Fundamental Rights), Serbia needs to implement 
numerous reforms and activities that have a direct impact on the daily life of 
citizens. Establishing a reliable judicial system, in which citizens will be able to 
protect their rights and receive final judgments within the optimum period, is the 
basic benefit of all activities undertaken in the field of judicial reform. In addition, 
with an efficient justice system and an effective fight against corruption, Serbia 
becomes a reliable country with a stable legal system and in this way becomes 
attractive for investment (Subotić 2016, 7-8). 
In support of the foregoing, the conclusion is also that the violation of private 
property and contractual rights, or their expropriation, inevitably leads to the 
reduction of the actual and expected returns, which leads to a weakening of 
incentives for the owners of the production factors to invest them. For what reason, 
any investor who rationally behaves will invest his own production factors if there 
is a great danger of expropriation of the yield of this investment. The greater 
likelihood of a violation of private property rights leads to less probability of 
investing, which leads to a reduction in the investment rate, which undermines the 
economic growth rate (Begović 2011, 176). 
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If we observe the EU requirements that are mentioned above, it is important to note 
that the representation of the rule of law institutions is important for EU accession. 
Two very important types of institutions are highlighted: inclusive and extractive 
institutions. Inclusive institutions contribute to economic activity, productivity 
growth and, economic progress. Such institutions provide security of private 
property, an impartial legal system and public services that enable equity in the 
exchange and contracting policy, as well as citizens' participation in economic 
activities (Acemoglu 2009, 58-63). We can conclude that greater representation of 
this type of institution contributes to EU integration, as well as the achievement of 
higher rates of economic growth. 
The basic characteristic of inclusive institutions is that they function on the 
principles of the rule of law, which implies that laws are applied equally to all 
citizens. The value of the principle of the rule of law is reflected not only in equality 
before the law but also in providing opportunities for wider involvement in political 
processes. In this way, established, inclusive political institutions support inclusive 
economic institutions that speak of their interconnectedness (Jakšić and Jakšić 2018, 
5-10). 
Inclusive institutions create inclusive markets, allow individuals to get educated and 
choose their own profession with complete freedom. They encourage companies to 
create innovations and invest in state-of-the-art technology. Residents of countries 
with such type of institutions have access to political institutions, which gives them 
the opportunity to participate in the democratic process, to elect representatives of 
the authorities, change them, etc. It should also be emphasized that the security of 
property rights, legal regulations, public services and the freedom of contracting and 
exchanging depend primarily on a government that is firmly linked to economic 
institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 87-88). 
Extractive institutions are the opposite of inclusive institutions. They aim to seize 
income and wealth from one social subgroup in favor of the other. These 
institutions extract wealth from the majority of citizens and redistribute it to the 
minority by which they received such a name. Such institutions do not have 
incentives for savings, investments, innovations (Vanino and Lee 2018, 10-13). 
Extractive institutions allow access to political power only to a privileged circle of 
people, while inclusive institutions provide a chance for more people to participate 
in political life or economic process and have access to political power and 
economic wealth. The classic examples of extractive institutions are high tax 
rates108, high fees for starting a business, banning imports or exports, and so on. 
Extractive institutions enable acquiring big profits and wealth through gaining of 
power, the appropriation of others' property and the establishment of monopolies 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, 89-92). 
The presence of inclusive institutions in one country facilitates EU accession. The 
chapter on competition (Chapter 8: Competition) is one of the most demanding and 
complicated chapters and consists of three parts: competition policy in the narrow 
                                                          
108 The rate of income tax for citizens which moves within the limits of normal will affect that citizens regularly 
settle this obligation. However, that rate is extremely high, the only thing we can expect is the avoidance of tax 
payments by citizens (tax evasion), the rise in the gray economy, a significant decline in the employment rate. 
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sense (the fight against monopoly and concentration), state aid control policy and 
liberalization of certain sectors of the economy. These areas include rules and 
procedures for combating the monopolistic behavior of the companies (such as 
limiting agreements between companies and abuse of a dominant position), rules for 
examining the merger of enterprises and rules for preventing the granting of state 
aid that distorts or may impair competition in the internal market (Međak 2016, 51-
53). 
The emergence, development, and establishment of inclusive institutions is not a 
short process and it also implies the fulfillment of certain political prerequisites 
such as the representation of parliamentary tradition and therefore political culture, 
compliance with laws and regulations, respecting private property, respecting state 
property, strong public opinion, etc. One state can certainly not achieve economic 
progress if the backward industry is not exposed to competition, the economy is 
subsidized, companies and banks that achieve poor business results are not closed, 
protection of the property is not represented, the free flow of labor is prevented, 
innovation and creativity are not encouraged, resources are not in the hands of those 
who are the most capable, the functioning of market laws according to which should 
survive only competitive and successful enterprises for whose products there is a 
demand, is not possible (Acemoglu and Robinson 2010, 17-25). 
EU Membership requires that the candidate country present an industry 
development policy and a restructuring strategy in order to assess whether their 
industrial policies are in line with EU principles, especially in terms of privatization 
and restructuring. For example, all state-owned companies in Serbia will have to go 
through the adjustment process, which implies structural and organizational changes 
in these companies and their preparation for independent and competitive 
participation in a market game. Industrial policy is closely linked to competition 
policy (including state aid). EU industrial policy has the authority to control and 
limit subsidies and other forms of state aid, both at national and EU level. (Međak 
2016, 75). 
 
INSTITUTIONS IN SERBIA 
If we look at Serbia during the nineties of the twentieth century, we can see that 
institutions that promoted the rule of law were not represented. On the contrary, 
wealth was concentrated in the hands of a small number of members of the political 
and economic elite. Processes of privatization and restructuring of enterprises have 
run slowly and have been burdened with many problems and unresolved issues. 
There were very complicated bureaucratic procedures for starting a business, loss-
making companies continued to operate with state subsidies, there was no 
competition, and consequently, the generation of monopolistic and oligopolistic 
structures could not be prevented. In addition, no legal regulations were adopted 
which would define bankruptcy, competition, privatization, investment funds, etc. 
(Grujić and Uzelac 2011, 115-119). 
The numerous studies conducted by the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, 
and many foundations are focused on measuring the quality of institutions in 
countries around the world. The aim of the conducted research is to create certain 
indicators on the basis of which one can draw conclusions about how much an 
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economy is stable, whether the rule of law is represented, whether society is 
corrupt, how efficient the judiciary is, what are the limitations of government 
intervention and power, whether the labor market is free, etc. 
 
Table 1. The ranking of the institutional indicators of Serbia 
Institutions Value Rank/140 
Organized crime 
1-7 (best) 
 
4.1 
 
104 
Homicide rate 
/100,000 pop. 
 
1.4 
 
46 
Terrorism incidence 
0 (very high) -100 (no incidence) 
 
99.9 
 
55 
Reliability of police services 
1-7 (best) 
 
4.1 
 
89 
Social capital 
0-100 (high) 
 
n/a 
 
n/a 
Budget transparency 
0-100 (best) 
 
61.5 
 
49 
Judicial independence 
1-7 (best) 
 
3.0 
 
107 
Efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations 
1-7 (best) 
 
2.9 
 
98 
Freedom of the press 
0-100 (worst) 
 
29.6 
 
63 
Burden of government regulation 
1-7 (best) 
 
2.8 
 
113 
Efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes 
1-7 (best) 
 
2.9 
 
108 
E-Participation Index  
0-1 (best) 
 
0.81 
 
47 
Future orientation of government 
1-7 (best) 
 
3.5 
 
81 
Incidence of corruption 
0-100 (best) 
 
41.0 
 
66 
Property rights 
1-7 (best) 
 
3.7 
 
115 
Intellectual property protection 
1-7 (best) 
 
3.6 
 
100 
Quality of land administration 
0-30 (best) 
 
18.0 
 
52 
Strength of auditing and reporting standards 
1-7 (best) 
 
4.0 
 
108 
Conflict of interest regulation 
0-10 (best) 
 
5.0 
 
95 
Shareholder governance 
0-10 (best) 
 
6.3 
 
45 
 
If we analyze the World Economic Forum data presented in The Global 
Competitiveness Report 2018, institutions present the first pillar of competitiveness 
of a total of twelve. The ranking of the twenty institutional indicators of Serbia is 
presented in Table 1. By analyzing the presented data from this table, it is observed 
that Serbia ranks 115th out of 140 countries in property rights. This is also the 
lowest ranked institutional indicator. This is followed by the burden of government 
regulation with rank 113, then the efficiency of legal framework in settling disputes 
and the strength of auditing and reporting standards with rank 108 (Schwab 2018). 
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The 2018 Investment Climate Statement also provides information on property 
rights in Serbia. It states that Serbia has an adequate body of laws for the protection 
of property rights, but the procedure of enforcing property rights through the 
judicial system can run very slow. There are many factors that can complicate the 
issue of property rights such as requests for restitution, unlicensed and illegal 
construction, limitation of property rights to rights of use, outright title fraud, and 
other issues. Investors are cautioned to investigate thoroughly all property title 
issues on land intended for investment projects (Bureau of Economic and Business 
Affairs 2018). 
According to the Heritage Foundation, the Economic Freedom Index for Serbia is 
62.5. According to the value of this index, Serbia is ranked 80th out of 186 
countries. The Economic Freedom Index increased by 3.6 percentage points over 
the previous year. Serbia has advanced 19 places in comparison to the previous year 
on the Heritage List of Economic Freedom. Serbia is still recovering from years of 
international economic sanctions and damage from civil war and still making the 
transition from statism to a market economy. Inflation is under control, and the 
budget has stabilized. Many large state-owned enterprises in the electricity, 
communication and natural gas sectors should be reformed. Deeper institutional 
reforms are also needed to tackle bureaucracy, reduce corruption, and strengthen a 
judicial system that is vulnerable to political interference (The Heritage Foundation 
2018). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the previously announced information on the quality of institutions, Serbia 
should build inclusive institutions that will lead to economic progress and accelerate 
the EU integration process. The presence of inefficient institutions that do not 
promote the rule of law reflects the period of the nineties and the beginning of the 
twenty-first century when a lot of privatization processes failed. Unsuccessful 
transition and systemic corruption are the main features of a given period. In such 
circumstances, inadequate institutional infrastructure could not ensure a successful 
change of the economic system. 
During 2018, Serbia maintained macroeconomic stability. The process of fiscal 
consolidation continued with the faster growth of gross domestic product relative to 
initial forecasts, but the economic growth strategy based on investment and exports 
has not yet been fully realized. Therefore, the situation regarding the quality of 
institutions in Serbia has improved in recent times, but constant work on their 
improvement is necessary. Some of the important challenges for Serbia are the 
inefficiency of the judiciary, high corruption, large state-owned loss-making 
enterprises, informal economy. All these challenges adversely affect economic 
growth. 
EU membership is the foremost strategic foreign policy priority of the Republic of 
Serbia. Values promoted by EU member states are recognized as values that Serbia 
wants to further nurture, and the accession process is an opportunity for reforms and 
strengthening of European standards. In addition, the European Union is the most 
important trade and investment partner of Serbia and thus one of the most important 
factors of economic stability of the country. 
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